Electromagnetic Leakage Defense Method for Smart Grid Terminals Based on Noise Interference

doi:10.3969/j.issn.1008-0198.2025.04.019

Abstract

Abstract: For potential electromagnetic leakage vulnerabilities in smart grid terminals, the mechanism and propagation path of electromagnetic leakage in smart grid terminal are systematically analyzed, revealing that the human body as a conductor forms common-mode coupling, which is the main channel for electromagnetic signal leakage. In view of the limitations of traditional defense methods in smart grid terminal scenarios, a defense method based on noise interference is proposed. A device is designed to inject random-frequency (below 100 Hz) and random-amplitude (1~3 V) interference signals into the human body through an electrostatic wristband. Experimental results show that the proposed defense method can effectively reduce information leakage via electromagnetic side channels, enhance the security of sensitive operation process in smart grid terminals (especially in distribution automation applications) and offer a new technical idea for the construction of information security protection systems in new power systems.

Key words: smart grid terminal, electromagnetic leakage defense, noise interference, machine learning

CLC Number:

TM727

LONG Yanbo, QIAO Hong, WANG Kaiyi, XIAO Jian, LIU Shuai. Electromagnetic Leakage Defense Method for Smart Grid Terminals Based on Noise Interference[J]. Hunan Electric Power, 2025, 45(4): 133-142.

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